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1. Introduction 
 
Reasons for a corporate restructuring vary and might include a desire to divest of 
underperforming assets, generate cash for more productive (or perhaps wasteful) needs, 
or a desire to focus on an area of corporate competence, higher growth or improved 
profitability. A firm may divest itself of a line of business by restructuring through a sale, 
by either liquidating the assets, or selling them as part of a going concern to a competitor 
or investor. Alternatively, a firm can spinoff this line of business to existing shareholders, 
either through an equity carve-out, pure spinoff or a hybrid transaction. In an equity 
carveout the firm issues shares in a initial public offering for the newly created 
subsidiary. In a pure spinoff, shares of the new firm are granted to existing shareholders 
in the form of a tax-free dividend. In a hybrid transaction, there is an equity carve-out 
followed by a spinoff. A firm may also elect to create a tracking stock for the line of 
business, but this does not accomplish the goal of asset divestiture. 
This study considers only pure (tax-free) spinoffs to shareholders in which a new 
entity is created and trades separately. We examine ex ante whether the parent firms’ 
size, available investment opportunities, capital structure or ownership structure is a 
predictor for positive cumulative abnormal returns for holders of shares in either the 
parent, the spinoff or both. 
Specifically, we hypothesize the following: a parent firm with a greater 
percentage of insider ownership, a higher than average debt-to-capital ratio, with a 
smaller market capitalization, spinning off a greater percentage of the firm, in the face of 
fewer attractive investment opportunities is more likely to produce positive abnormal 
returns for its shareholders after a spinoff. An argument in support of this hypothesis 
follows. 
 
1.1 Ownership Structure 
 
We hypothesize that a firm with a greater percentage of insider ownership 
implementing a spinoff is more likely to produce positive abnormal returns. A 
management team with a greater percentage of firm ownership has its interests more 
closely aligned with those of the firm’s other shareholders, who are primarily interested 
in value-maximization through capital appreciation (in a growth company). Management 
is therefore more likely to spinoff a subsidiary in the interest of creating value for all 
shareholders, in spite of the following reasons why it might be against management’s 
own interests to enact a spinoff. 
A spinoff reduces agency costs in the form of information problems that can make 
the external monitoring of management difficult (Meyer et al., 1992). These include 
consolidated financial statements, cross-subsidies and transfer pricing (to mask 
underperforming divisions), as well as fewer trips to external capital markets (requiring a 
reduction in the disclosure of operating details). The diversification of cash flows in a 
consolidated firm reduces the overall volatility of earnings, and therefore the danger to 
management of being ousted by disappointed shareholders. Furthermore, a manager of a 
larger firm might better justify a higher salary and a greater level of corporate perks (or 
waste, depending on your view; for instance, a corporate jet, fancier headquarters, etc…). 
Lastly, a spinoff reduces the size of a firm under the responsibility of management, with 
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no infusion of capital to the parent firm. All of these reasons would tend to reduce 
management’s interest in diminishing the size of their empire (Jensen et al., 1976). 
It is therefore hypothesized that if a firm with a greater percentage of insider 
ownership spins off a subsidiary, it does so for reasons of value creation in the interests 
of all shareholders, and is therefore more likely to earn positive abnormal returns. 
 
It is also hypothesized that the effect of the percentage of institutional ownership 
of a firm should also result in a similar, though likely weaker, correlation. Holders of 
large blocks of shares may exert their influence over management to make value-
increasing decisions, even when they are against management’s personal interests. This 
effect would be expected to be greatest when the institutional shareholders take an active 
role in the operational management of their investments (the measurement of which is 
unfortunately beyond the scope of this study).  
 
The remaining shareholders, being large in number and small in ownership stakes, 
suffer from communication and holdout problems. Other factors being equal, the firms 
with the highest percentage of widely held shares should therefore have the lowest 
abnormal returns, as the reasons for which the spinoff is occurring may not be in the 
interests of the small shareholders, who lack the coordination to effectively monitor or 
influence management.  
 
1.2 Absolute Size 
 
We hypothesize that smaller parent firms (on an absolute market cap basis) are 
more likely to lead to positive abnormal returns when spinning off a subsidiary than 
would a larger firm. The reasoning is that smaller firms are likely to have less monitoring 
from the market through institutional research coverage. Since the division being spun off  
is a fraction of what is already a small firm, it is possibly not fully understood, and 
therefore mispriced when spun out. (JP Morgan, 1995) 
 
1.3 Capital Structure 
 
We hypothesize that a firm with a greater level of debt in its capital structure is 
more likely to lead to positive abnormal returns when spinning off a subsidiary than 
would a firm with less debt. Debt is a form of bonding between management and 
shareholders, which reduces some need for external monitoring. This is because interest 
payments are non-discretionary, unlike other forms of payment to a firm’s suppliers of 
capital, through dividends and/or stock repurchases. Furthermore, if the firm’s debt were 
such a burden that the firm might be nearing distress, it would likely engage in an asset 
sale or equity carveout (Ofek, 1993). Instead, a spinoff generates no cash for the parent 
company. Though there have been instances of management expropriating wealth from 
debtholders to equity-holders through a spinoff , such as the Marriott case (Parrino, 
1997), they are not common. Our hypothesis is that a management group willing to take 
on debt reduces the owner/management agency problem and has interests more closely 
aligned with its equity shareholders, and is therefore more likely to lead to positive 
abnormal returns. 
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1.4 Relative Spinoff Size 
 
We hypothesize that a firm spinning off a greater percentage of its assets is more 
likely to lead to positive abnormal returns than would a firm spinning off a smaller 
percentage. We argue that this act diminishes management’s empire, increases the 
volatility of cash flows and reduces agency costs. Therefore, management’s willingness 
to undertake this action signals their alignment with shareholders’ interests. 
 
1.5 Investment Opportunities 
 
Lastly, we hypothesize that a firm with fewer investment opportunities is more 
likely to yield positive abnormal returns. We examine a firm’s Tobin’s Q ratio as a proxy 
for investment opportunities and hypothesize that a firm with a lower Tobin’s Q has a 
greater upside potential from a spinoff  than does a firm with a higher Q. We reason that 
if a firm has attractive investment opportunities for its capital and discloses this 
information to an efficient market, the market should reward it with a higher valuation, 
and therefore higher Tobin’s Q. Similarly, firm with fewer investment opportunities is 
given a lower Tobin’s Q, for the same asset base, as investors assume the firm will either 
earn the risk-free rate on its excess capital, waste in on negative NPV projects, or perhaps 
return it to its suppliers of capital, subjecting it to reinvestment risk. A firm with a very 
low Q ratio (less than one) trades for less than its replacement value of its assets. Due to 
the unattractiveness of the investment opportunities the firm faces, it can be expected that 
fewer competitors will enter its market, and thus it will face less competition. Through a 
successful  restructuring (such as a spinoff) it may increase its profitability.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes selected 
findings of others on this subject. Section 3 describes the sample selection and data 
acquisition methods, as well as presents the summary statistics. Section 4 describes the 
methodology used to compute the abnormal returns and multivariate regression of 
abnormal performance versus the predicted independent variables. Section 5 discusses 
the results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Previous Work 
 
Though many studies have examined spinoff announcement period returns, 
comparatively few have looked at the long-run performance following spinoffs. Some of 
the more relevant findings are discussed below. 
De Vroom & van Frederikslust in 1999 examined global data from 1990 through 
1998, looking at the effect of the initial spinoff announcement on shareholder wealth. 
They found, consistent with other’s results, a 2.6% positive return over a 3-day 
announcement window. 
JP Morgan conducted an oft-quoted, yet remarkably elusive study in 1995 
(followed on with an addendum of new samples in 1997) of the long run performance of 
spinoffs following a corporate restructuring. They found that spinoffs comprising a 
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relatively larger percentage of a firm’s assets (defined as more than 10% of the parent’s 
market capitalization), and those that were absolutely smaller (defined as less than 
$200MM) outperformed their peers. 
Desai & Jain in 1999 conducted a study of the long-run stock market performance 
of spinoffs, with a sample of 155 transactions between the years 1975 and 1991, and 
found that focus-increasing spinoffs resulted in significantly larger cumulative abnormal 
returns than those for non-focus increasing spinoffs. They also confirmed that 
announcement period returns are significantly larger for focus-increasing firms than non-
focus increasing firms. 
Powers in 2000 examined potential motivations for a firm to select a spinoff 
versus a selloff or equity carve-out. He examined financial need, focus, managerial 
incentives and the prospective price for the subsidiary as potential independent variables. 
He found that financial need and pricing seem to play a role in the decision. 
 
 
3. Data Selection 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
 
The sample is gathered from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
data sets. The CRSP data sets contain Distribution Arrays, which list distribution dates, 
amounts and types for a firm over a period of interest. A dividend distribution code of 
“3753” or “3763” corresponds to a tax-free dividend in the stock of a different firm from 
the issuer, i.e. a spin-off. 1 Searching through the dividend distribution codes for all firms 
which traded publicly in the US during the years 1990-1999, with dividend codes of 3753 
or 3763, yields a list of CUSIPs, corresponding to parent firms, from which this study’s 
sample is selected. 
Using the CRSP Company Name History for each CUSIP yields the parent firm’s 
name at the time of the event, which is then used as a keyword in UMI’s ProQuest 
service to find the corresponding Wall Street Journal (and/or other contemporary news 
media) articles announcing the transaction. This method is used to determine the identity 
of the spinoff firm, whether the transaction is a spinoff or a equity-carveout, and the 
distribution ratio of shares given to existing shareholders.  
Through this selection methodology we obtain a non-exhaustive sample of 67 
transactions, consisting of 56 distinct parent firms (some had multiple spinoffs during the 
sample period) and 67 spinoff firms. 
 
3.2 Measurements 
 
For each parent and spinoff firm, historical daily closing prices are obtained from 
Yahoo! (adjusted for dividends and splits). If the data is not available from Yahoo!, 
                                                 
1 Dividend Distribution 3763 definition: Event type: exchange or reorganization; Payment method: an issue 
of a different common stock which is on the file; Dividend Frequency: year end or final; Event descriptor: 
non-ordinary distribution in another stock. (Source: CRSP Data Description Guide). 
 
 5
CRSP raw average daily closing prices are used, with adjustments made for splits and 
dividends as indicated in the firms CRSP Distribution Array.  
The market capitalization for each parent firm is calculated using the number of 
outstanding shares given in the 10Q filed most recently prior to the ex dividend date (as 
represented by COMPUSTAT), and closing price two days prior to the ex dividend date 
(EX-2d). The market capitalization of each spinoff firm is calculated using the ratio of 
shares distributed to existing shareholders and the closing price two days after the ex 
dividend date (EX+2d). This yields the data necessary to determine the ratio of market 
capitalization of the parent firm that the spinoff represents. 
We then examine each parent firm’s capital structure, using its book debt ratio as 
a proxy. We refer to the most recently filed 10Q prior to the ex dividend date, and obtain 
this data from COMPUSTAT.  
To obtain the parent firm’s Tobin’s Q, we use the firms market-to-book value 
ratio as a proxy, and again we refer to the most recently filed 10Q prior to the ex dividend 
date, and obtain data from COMPUSTAT. 
We then examine each parent firm’s ownership structure, as represented by the 
proportion of its traded shares in the hands of institutional investors or company insiders 
from the most recent 13F filing prior to the ex dividend date. This historical information 
is obtained from Disclosure Inc.’s Compact D-SEC electronic databases for each year. 
We make the assumption that shares not held by insiders or institutions can be 
categorized as “widely held.” 
 
3.2 Summary Statistics 
 
The summary statistics for the sample selected can be found below in Table 3.2.1 
and Table 3.2.2. Table 3.2.1 describes the market capitalization, book debt ration, 
Tobin’s Q and ownership distribution for the average parent sample, given the most 
recent information available to an investor on the EX+2d date for each firm. Note that the 
average parent firm in our sample has a lower debt ratio, lower insider ownership and 
higher institutional ownership than the market averages. Table 3.2.2 describes the market 
capitalization of each subsidiary at the EX+2d closing share price, and what percentage 
of the parent’s pre-spinoff market capitalization that represents.  
 
Table 3.2.1: Sample Summary Statistics (All dollar figures are in $millions)  
          Share Ownership 
Parent  Market Cap Debt Ratio Tobin’s Q Insider Institutional Widely Held 
 Average $ 7,835.6 43.5% 5.46 5.9% 55.7% 38.4% 
 Median $ 3,396.7 42.5% 2.97 1.4% 58.1% 38.4% 
 Std Deviation $ 12,450.4 22.2% 8.92 9.8% 15.1% 12.9% 
        
 Minimum $ 10.6 0.0% 0.02 0.0% 10.5% 14.6% 
 Maximum $ 70,240.6 90.3% 48.09 50.4% 82.6% 73.0% 
  Count 64 64 64 57 57 57 
        
 Market Avg.2 49.2% 11.4% 35.3% 53.3% 
                                                 
2  Source: Sample of 5761 firms compiled by Prof. Aswath Damodaran: www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/ 
datasets/dbtfund.xls  
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Table 3.2.2: Sample Summary Statistics (All dollar figures are in $millions)  
 
As Percent  
Spinoff  Market Cap of Parent        
 Average $ 860.0 15.5%    
 Median $ 438.3 11.1%    
 Std Deviation $ 1,036.2 14.3%    
        
 Minimum $ 2.0 0.5%    
 Maximum $ 4,845.3 57.2%    
  Count 57 57  
  
   
        
      
Distributions of the sample statistics can be found in Exhibit 1 through Exhibit 6, in 
Appendix A. 
 
 
4. Methodology 
 
Abnormal returns for the parent, spinoff and pro-forma firm are measured versus 
the market index, as represented by the CRSP value-weighted total stock market index 
(NYSE + NASDAQ + AMEX), including dividend distributions, and the NASDAQ SPY 
index.3  
 
Abnormal returns are defined as: 
 
ARi,t = Ri,t – R(MKT)t  
 
Where 
 
ARi,t  = abnormal return of security i on day t 
Ri,t  = raw returns of security i on day t 
R(MKT)t  = raw return of the Index on day t 
 
From the adjusted daily prices, we calculate raw returns for each parent and 
spinoff firm, assuming that an investor purchases a fixed dollar amount of shares in each 
on the second day after the spinoff ex dividend date (EX+2 days). These shares are then 
held, and we measure the holding period returns at six month intervals for a total of five 
years, providing that the data exists (e.g. some firms are acquired, some go bankrupt, 
some transactions take place in 1998 and therefore have fewer available data points).  
We then compare these raw returns to the return an investor would receive if s/he 
invests the same dollar value into the aforementioned index on the same dates. The 
difference over this range of dates is the holding period cumulative abnormal return. A 
pro-forma firm’s performance is also measured, reflecting how an investor would fare 
                                                 
3 The SPY index was used for all dates for which it was available. For dates prior to its existence, it was 
indexed appropriately and chained to the CRSP value-weighted total stock market index. 
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buying shares of both the parent and spinoff firm, in the proportion of the spinoff 
distribution, starting two days after the ex dividend date (EX+2d). 
The results from this stage are summarized in Table 5.1.1, and discussed in 
Section 5.1. 
This data is then tested against the hypothesized explanatory variables, using 
multivariate regression. The following variables are tested: 
 
ARi,t = a  + b1(MVP)i + b2(PCT) i + b3(BDR) i + b4(TBQ) i +  
b5(INT) i + b6(INS) i + b7(WID) i 
 
Where  
 
MVP  =  the market value of the parent firm 
PCT  =  the percent of the parent being spun off 
BDR  =  the book debt ratio of the parent 
TBQ  =  the parent firm’s Tobin’s Q 
INT  =  the parent firm’s percent of institutional shareholders 
INS  =  the parent firm’s percent of insider shareholders 
WID  =  the parent firm’s percent of shares that are widely held 
 
This test is run for each holding period, and for each group of firms: parents, 
spinoffs and pro-forma. A backwards stepwise multivariate regression is then run on the 
data, but does not reveal significant differences from the initial regression results, and the 
results are not included. A univariate regression series is run on those variables with the 
greatest explanatory power and statistical significance. As the relationships between the 
all of the independent variables and the returns are most easily visualized through the 
initial multivariate regression data provided herein, the univariate results are also omitted.  
The results from this stage are summarized in Tables 5.2.1, Table 5.2.2, and Table 
5.2.3.  
 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Abnormal Returns 
 
The results of the calculations that yield the average abnormal returns for the 
parent, spinoff and pro-forma firm are shown below in Figure 5.1.1 as well as detailed in 
Table 5.1.1.  
An examination of Table 5.1.1 reveals that the average parent firm’s abnormal 
returns stem from a few outliers which skew the data. For instance, a firm which 
produces fiber-optic products saw tremendous abnormal returns in 1999 (with a positive 
holding period abnormal return of over 1,100% after 3 years), at the height of the Internet 
investing bubble, and has since given up all of those gains. Note that the percent of all 
firms with positive abnormal returns in any one year never exceeds 46%.  
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The average spinoff does show a positive abnormal return for the first two years 
(consistent with the findings of JP Morgan’s study of 1997). The pro-forma firm, not 
surprisingly, shows a benefit of diversification, with reduced volatility. 
 
Figure 5.1.1: Parent, Spinoff and Pro-forma Firm Performance After Spinoff 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns
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5.2 Regression Results 
 
The results of the multivariate regression are detailed in Tables 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 
5.2.3, and discussed below. 
 
5.2.1 Ownership Structure Regression Results 
 
For both parents and spinoffs during the first 2.5 years post ex dividend date there 
is an inverse relationship between the percentage of insider ownership and positive 
abnormal returns, but it is never statistically significant at the 5% level using a two-tailed 
t-test. The same holds true for the parent firm’s performance versus the percentage of 
institutional and widely held shares. For the spinoff firm, the relationship changes from 
measurement to measurement, and is only once statistically significant. We therefore 
reject the hypothesis that there is a relationship between the percentage of a firm that is 
either widely held or institutionally held and positive abnormal returns for either the 
parent of spinoff. 
For the parent firm, however, at the EX+3y, EX+3.5y and EX+4 year intervals, 
there is a positive correlation between the percentage of the firm owned by insiders and 
abnormal returns, statistically significant at the 1% level. This result supports our 
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hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between the percentage of inside 
ownership of a firm and the parent firm’s long term performance relative to the market. 
 Figure 5.2.1 shows the results of plotting the parent firms’ ownership structure 
versus their abnormal returns, when divided into two groups by their percentage of 
insider ownership: “low insider ownership” (defined here as less than the market average, 
or 11.4%) or “high insider ownership” (greater than the market average, or 11.4%).  
 
Figure 5.2.1: Parent Firm Performance After Spinoff 
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5.2.2  Absolute Size Regression Results 
 
The sample yields no statistically significant relationship between the market 
value of the parent and the performance of either the parent of spinoff. We therefore 
reject the hypothesis. 
 
5.2.3 Capital Structure Regression Results 
 
Examining the parent firm’s performance versus the firm’s capital structure, we 
see that at EX+0.5y there is a positive relationship between a firm’s book debt ratio and 
positive abnormal performance, statistically significant at the 5% level. This holds true as 
well for the spinoff firm at EX+1.5y, EX+2y and EX+2.5y, and supports our hypothesis.  
If we compare, in Figure 5.2.3, those parent firms with lower debt ratios (defined 
here as less than the market average of 49.5%) and those with higher debt ratios (defined 
here as greater than or equal to the market average of  49.5%) against their abnormal 
returns, we see this relationship more clearly. 
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Figure 5.2.3: Parent Firm Performance After Spinoff 
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5.2.4 Relative Spinoff Size Regression Results 
 
There are no statistically significant (at the 5% level) results from the regression 
of relative spinoff size versus performance. At EX+2y and EX+2.5 years there is a 
positive correlation between the size of the spinoff as a percentage of the parent and the 
parent’s positive abnormal returns (at the 10% level). For the spinoff we see a 
relationship between size and performance, but here it is inversely related after one year 
(and significant only at the 10% level). We find that the relationship is not robust and 
reject the hypothesis. 
 
5.2.5 Investment Opportunities Regression Results 
 
There is no statistically significant relationship between the performance of the 
parent firms and their Tobin’s Q prior to the spinoff ex divided date. There is a one-
period negative relationship between abnormal performance of the spinoffs and the 
parent’s  Tobin’s Q at EX+2.0y, significant at 5% level. We find that the relationship is 
not robust and reject the hypothesis. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We examine the performance of 67 pairs of parent and spinoff firms versus the 
market in the 1990s. We try to explain abnormal returns of the parent or spinoff  firm by 
way of the absolute size of the parent, the relative size of the spinoff, the capital structure, 
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the ownership structure and the availability of attractive investment opportunities to the 
parent. 
Overall, our results are mixed. We find that parent firms with a higher than 
average percentage of insider ownership yield greater positive abnormal returns than do 
their peers. Similarly, those parent firms with a greater than average book debt ratio yield 
greater positive abnormal returns than do their peers. We hypothesized that two ways of 
aligning managements interest with those of the shareholders are through an increased 
book debt ratio or increased management ownership stake in the firm. Our results 
confirm our hypotheses that a management team with interests more closely aligned with 
those of their shareholders are more likely to take actions that are value-increasing for the 
benefit of all shareholders. However, the ownership and capital structure information we 
examined is available to all investors prior to the spinoff, and our results therefore 
conflict with notions of market efficiency. Further research into this relationship is 
warranted. 
We find that there is no statistically significant or longitudinally robust 
relationship between the absolute size of the parent, the size of the parent relative to the 
spinoff, the percentage of shares held either widely or by institutions, or the parent firm’s 
Tobin’s Q and the performance of the parent firm. 
We also find that there is no statistically significant or longitudinally robust 
relationship between any of the hypothesized predictors and the performance of the spun 
off subsidiaries. This suggests that the performance of the spinoff is dependent on 
exogenous factors and is consistent with market efficiency. 
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Table 5.1.1: Holding Period Cumulative Abnormal Return        
    Years post ex dividend 
    0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
Parent Average 1.5% 7.8% 5.0% 15.2% 22.8% 32.4% 30.4% 14.8% -6.2% -33.1% 
 Median -2.4% -4.0% -7.1% -7.6% -18.7% -19.2% -40.0% -34.70% -57.3% -72.9% 
 Std Deviation 36.8% 53.4% 71.0% 101.6% 159.4% 190.8% 188.4% 162.2% 161.6% 147.4% 
            
 Minimum -98.6% -108.2% -132.3% -169.7% -143.1% -179.0% -228.8% -268.9% -287.1% -256.9% 
 Maximum 171.3% 235.4% 291.2% 548.1% 966.7% 1130.7% 639.7% 539.0% 540.7% 515.0% 
            
 % Positive 43.3% 43.9% 39.4% 45.9% 43.1% 44.4% 40.0% 39.6% 34.2% 24.2% 
 Count 67 66 66 61 58 54 50 48 38 33 
            
Spinoff Average 12.9% 8.8% 3.5% 6.6% -10.0% -18.8% -6.1% -29.5% -62.6% -53.7% 
 Median 1.2% 2.1% -3.4% 4.4% -24.4% -31.9% -32.2% -55.4% -70.7% -110.0% 
 Std Deviation 60.4% 74.5% 82.2% 104.5% 108.8% 113.4% 159.3% 150.1% 127.5% 174.3% 
            
 Minimum -71.2% -100.9% -117.5% -130.9% -148.6% -187.0% -213.1% -263.3% -271.0% -321.8% 
 Maximum 252.2% 305.1% 387.6% 563.4% 631.8% 562.9% 627.9% 465.9% 149.1% 313.0% 
            
 % Positive 52.2% 51.5% 49.2% 50.0% 36.5% 31.3% 37.2% 32.5% 32.3% 36.0% 
 Count 67 66 63 58 52 48 43 40 31 25 
            
Pro-forma Average 8.1% 9.9% 4.5% 18.8% 16.6% 27.8% 37.5% 12.2% -4.7% -31.6% 
 Median -1.0% 3.1% -6.5% 1.2% -23.1% -29.8% -33.8% -50.3% -33.9% -64.4% 
 Std Deviation 52.4% 68.8% 83.8% 123.1% 181.1% 219.2% 212.9% 195.4% 199.2% 202.8% 
   
 Minimum -109.2% -105.9% -140.3% -176.8% -169.2% -201.0% -264.2% -279.3% -332.5% -319.7% 
 Maximum 169.1% 265.0% 335.2% 660.8% 1093.1% 1243.2% 629.2% 563.5% 586.5% 690.8% 
            
 % Positive 46.8% 54.1% 42.6% 50.0% 39.6% 44.9% 40.0% 39.5% 38.2% 33.3% 
  Count 62 61 61 56 53 49 45 43 34 30 
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Table 5.2.1: Parent Regression Parameter Estimates  
  Regression Variable 
    Intercept   
Spinoff as 
Percent of 
Parent   Debt Ratio   Pct Insider   
Pct 
Institutional   
Pct Widely 
Held   Tobin’s Q   Parent MV   R2 Obs 
0.5 1.008  0.205  0.447 ** -1.541 -1.166  -1.185  -0.004  0.000  19.0% 48 
 (1.008) (0.935) (2.381)  -(1.541) -(1.166) -(1.185) -(0.852) -(0.905)   
1.0 0.564 0.082 0.239  -0.179 -0.664 -0.676 -0.005 0.000 5.3% 48 
 (0.564) (0.238) (0.811)  -(0.179) -(0.664) -(0.676) -(0.738) -(0.387)   
1.5 1.191 0.387 0.207  -1.123 -1.460 -1.195 -0.003 0.000 9.2% 48 
 (1.191) (0.842) (0.528)  -(1.123) -(1.460) -(1.195) -(0.307) -(1.298)   
2.0 0.637 1.175* 0.622  -1.445 -1.322 -0.672 -0.012 0.000 20.7% 44 
 (0.637) (1.885) (1.253)  -(1.445) -(1.322) -(0.672) -(0.968) -(0.568)   
2.5 -0.051 1.512* 0.995  -1.436 -0.913 -0.145 -0.018 0.000 23.0% 43 
 -(0.051) (1.905) (1.573)  -(1.436) -(0.913) -(0.145) -(1.122) -(0.240)   
3.0 -0.122 0.660 1.233  3.027*** -1.080 0.288 -0.031 0.000 22.8% 39 
 -(0.122) (0.541) (1.245)  (3.027) -(1.080) (0.288) -(1.278) -(0.139)   
3.5 0.417 -1.044 2.092  5.401*** -1.596 -0.419 -0.038 0.000 13.5% 35 
 (0.417) -(0.407) (0.968)  (5.401) -(1.596) -(0.419) -(0.684) -(0.096)   
4.0 -0.624 -0.796 2.652  6.676*** -0.538 -0.452 -0.043 0.000 22.6% 33 
 -(0.624) -(0.376) (1.411)  (6.676) -(0.538) -(0.452) -(0.941) -(0.281)   
4.5 0.762 0.635 0.562  6.148 -2.028 -1.259 -0.034 0.000 21.1% 27 
 (0.000) (0.266) (0.282)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -(0.707) (0.377)   
5.0 0.899 1.161 0.206  -5.873 -1.750 -0.994 -0.020 0.000 6.9% 23 
Ye
ar
s 
po
st
 e
x 
di
vi
de
nd
 
  (0.000)  (0.478)  (0.093)   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  -(0.425)  (0.113)      
  *** = significance at 1% level ** = significance at 5% level * = significance at 10% level  
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Table 5.2.2: Spinoff Regression Parameter Estimates  
  Regression Variable 
    Intercept   
Spinoff as 
Percent of 
Parent   Debt Ratio   Pct Insider   Pct Institutional   
Pct Widely 
Held   Tobin’s Q   Parent MV   R2 Obs 
0.5 0.466  -0.454  0.004   -1.655 -0.646  0.514  -0.003  0.000 13.4% 49 
 (0.466) -(0.810) (0.008)  -(1.655) -(0.646) (0.514) -(0.264) -(1.316)   
1.0 0.233 -0.790* 0.260  -1.991* -0.099 -0.146 -0.007 0.000 16.9% 48 
 (0.233) -(1.796) (0.694)  -(1.991) -(0.099) -(0.146) -(0.697) -(1.156)   
1.5 -0.747 -1.012 1.202 ** -1.831* 0.806 0.208 -0.024* 0.000 20.0% 48 
 -(0.747) -(1.589) (2.213)  -(1.831) (0.806) (0.208) -(1.740) -(0.475)   
2.0 -0.325 -0.567 1.586 ** -2.880 0.596 -0.858 -0.034** 0.000 24.7% 43 
 (0.000) -(0.693) (2.451)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -(2.084) -(0.772)   
2.5 -0.257 -0.336 1.175 ** -2.583 0.012 -0.459 -0.025* 0.000 19.7% 41 
 (0.000) -(0.465) (2.059)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -(1.737) -(0.914)   
3.0 0.088 -0.373 0.789  -3.475 -0.358 -0.202 -0.022 0.000 17.0% 37 
 (0.000) -(0.403) (1.061)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -(1.212) -(1.385)   
3.5 1.765 0.321 0.073  -4.987*** -2.341** -0.334 -0.022 0.000 10.2% 33 
 (1.765) (0.182) (0.050)  -(4.987) -(2.341) -(0.334) -(0.600) -(0.862)   
4.0 -1.160 0.032 0.713  -2.049 -0.238 2.400 -0.025 0.000 12.8% 30 
 (0.000) (0.017) (0.437)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -(0.616) -(0.501)   
4.5 -1.089 2.561 -0.339  -1.877 -0.520 2.357 -0.026 0.000 30.5% 22 
 (0.000) (1.106) -(0.220)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -(0.763) -(0.268)   
5.0 1.538 3.516 -5.269 * -10.238 -1.915 3.582 0.013 0.000 46.8% 18 
Ye
ar
s 
po
st
 e
x 
di
vi
de
nd
 
  (0.000)  (0.981)  -(1.794)   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.267)  (0.265)      
  *** = significance at 1% level ** = significance at 5% level * = significance at 10% level 
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Table 5.2.3: Pro-forma Regression Parameter Estimates  
  Regression Variable 
    Intercept   
Spinoff as 
Percent of 
Parent   Debt Ratio   Pct Insider   Pct Institutional   
Pct Widely 
Held   Tobin’s Q   
Parent 
MV   R2 Obs 
0.5 0.084  -0.107  0.506 -1.120  -0.427  0.264   -0.007   0.000   0.16226 48 
 (0.084) -(0.254) (1.575) -(1.120) -(0.427) (0.264)  -(0.859)  -(1.017)    
1.0 0.000 -0.450 0.326 0.200 -0.023 -0.148  -0.009  0.000  0.05297 47 
 (0.000) -(0.998) (0.921) (0.200) -(0.023) -(0.148)  -(1.023)  -(0.232)    
1.5 -0.238 -0.142 0.652 -0.141 -0.015 0.005  -0.017  0.000  0.09 47 
 -(0.238) -(0.234) (1.373) -(0.141) -(0.015) (0.005)  -(1.400)  -(0.864)    
2.0 -0.558 1.435 1.127 -1.198 0.079 -0.072  -0.033 * 0.000  0.22281 43 
 (0.000) (1.477) (1.661) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  -(1.978)  -(0.162)    
2.5 -1.205 1.339 1.500* -0.949 0.232 0.604  -0.037 * 0.000  0.23252 42 
 (0.000) (1.205) (1.931) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  -(1.930)  -(0.037)    
3.0 1.144 0.592 1.682 1.093 -2.389 -1.256  -0.050 * 0.000  0.21611 38 
 (0.000) (0.350) (1.399) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  -(1.750)  -(0.080)    
3.5 2.235 -0.352 1.525 4.125*** -3.798*** -0.982  -0.056  0.000  0.15677 34 
 (2.235) -(0.105) (0.632) (4.125) -(3.798) -(0.982)  -(0.950)  -(0.252)    
4.0 3.685 -0.518 2.518 2.636*** -5.403*** -3.864 *** -0.059  0.000  0.21253 32 
 (3.685) -(0.170) (1.084) (2.636) -(5.403) -(3.864)  -(1.077)  -(0.381)    
4.5 -2.485 3.166 -0.092 8.916*** 0.959 2.600 ** -0.065  0.000  0.24634 25 
 -(2.485) (0.866) -(0.037) (8.916) (0.959) (2.600)  -(1.138)  (0.363)    
5.0 3.298 6.167 -1.941 -11.948*** -3.936*** -1.962 * -0.041  0.000  0.26347 22 
Ye
ar
s 
po
st
 e
x 
di
vi
de
nd
 
  (3.298)  (1.551)  -(0.662)  -(11.948)  -(3.936)  -(1.962)   -(0.681)   (0.120)       
  *** = significance at 1% level ** = significance at 5% level * = significance at 10% level  
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Appendix A: Sample Summary Statistics 
 
 
Exhibit 1: Chronological Distribution of Spinoff Ex Dividend Dates 
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Exhibit 2: Parent Firm Market Capitalization Distribution, Pre-Spinoff 
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Exhibit 3: Parent Firm Book Debt Ratio Distribution, Pre-Spinoff 
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Exhibit 4: Distribution of Relative Size of Spinoffs as Percentage of Parent Firm Value 
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Exhibit 5: Parent Firm Ownership Structure, Pre-Spinoff 
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Exhibit 6: Parent Firm Tobin’s Q Distribution, Pre-Spinoff 
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